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Western Cab Co. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 10, (Mar. 16, 2017)1 
 
LABOR LAW: MINIMUM WAGE AMENDMENT 
Summary 
 An employer challenged the validity of Nevada’s Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA). 
The Court held that (1) the MWA is not preempted by the NLRA, (2) the MWA is not preempted 
by ERISA, and (3) the MWA is not unconstitutionally vague. The Court declined to address factual 
issues related to the employer’s wage calculations. 
 
Background 
In 2004 and 2006, the people of Nevada passed Question 6 to add the Minimum Wage 
Amendment (MWA) to the Nevada Constitution. The MWA requires employers to pay employees 
one of two wage rates, depending on whether qualifying employee health benefits are offered.2 
However, the MWA allows for an exception if through collective bargaining, the employer and 
employees agree to a lower wage in “clear and unambiguous terms.”3 
In 2012, petitioner Western started to require its drivers to pay directly for fuel instead of 
deducting the costs from drivers’ paychecks. Former cab drivers for Western and real parties in 
interest, Laksiri Perera, Irshad Ahmed, and Michael Sargeant, filed a complaint alleging that 
considering fuel costs, Western was paying its drivers a wage that fell below the constitutionally 
mandated minimum. Western moved to dismiss, claiming that fuel costs not be considered when 
calculating minimum wage, and that the MWA is invalid because (1) it is preempted by the NLRA, 
(2) it is preempted by ERISA, and (3) it is unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied 
Western’s motion, and Western petitioned the Court for extraordinary writ relief. 
 
Discussion 
 The Court was asked to address (1) whether the MWA is preempted by the NLRA; (2) 
whether the MWA is preempted by ERISA; (3) whether the MWA is void for vagueness; and (4) 
if the MWA is valid, whether fuel costs should be factored into calculating employer compliance. 
The Court concluded that review was warranted, chose to exercise their discretion to address the 
validity of the MWA, and held that it is valid on all three challenges. The Court declined to exercise 
their discretion regarding fuel-calculation because the facts weren’t developed in district court. 
 
Considering the facial challenges to the MWA serves the interests of judicial economy and 
streamlines this case, along with other MWA-related cases currently pending in the district courts 
A writ of mandamus is used to compel the performance of a duty required by law or to 
control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.4 A writ of prohibition may be used when 
a district court oversteps its jurisdiction.5 The Court generally refuses to issue an extraordinary 
writ when there is a “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”6 
                                                     
1  By Sydney Campau. 
2  Nev. Const. art. 15, § 16(A). 
3  Nev. Const. art. 15, § 16(B). 
4  Int’l Game Tech, Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008); see NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 34.160 (2016). 
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STAT. § 34.170 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.330 (2016). 
 Generally, the Court will decline to consider writ petitions unless it is clear that the district 
court is obligated to dismiss an action, or if an important legal issue requires clarification.7 The 
Court generally practices judicial restraint and hesitates to entertain writ petitions. However, the 
Court may use their discretion to consider writ petitions for the purpose of judicial economy.8 
 Western’s petition sought reversal of a denial of a motion to dismiss. Although these 
petitions are typically denied, the Court felt that this was an important legal issue and that resolving 
it would serve judicial economy, because if the MWA was invalid, the drivers (along with the 
plaintiffs in many other pending cases) would not have a cause of action. 
The Court held that unresolved factual matters precluded consideration of the fuel-
calculation issue, because there were facts missing from the record, namely whether Western and 
the drivers had agreed to the fuel payment system through collective bargaining. The Court 
reasoned that the constitutional and preemption issues could dispose of the litigation without 
requiring additional fact-finding.  
 
The NLRA does not preempt the MWA because minimum wage laws are part of the State’s police 
powers 
 Western claimed that the purpose of the MWA is to help unions and unionized employers 
compete with nonunionized employers, and that this resulted in NLRA preemption by violating 
the equitable bargaining process. The Court disagreed with Western. The establishment of labor 
standards falls within the police power of the State, so NLRA preemption should not be lightly 
inferred.9 The Supreme Court has inferred two types of preemption: Garmon preemption, which 
protects the Labor Board’s priority right to determine what is regulated under the NLRA,10 and 
Machinists preemption, which prohibits states from regulating conduct Congress intended to leave 
open for the free market to decide.11   
The Court has held that a complaint is not preempted under Garmon unless it is the kind 
that a worker should have presented to the Labor Board, and that a complaint is not preempted 
simply because the State is enforcing a law relating to labor relations.12 Minimum wage laws are 
an authorized exercise of a state’s police power.13 Thus, the MWA is not preempted under Garmon.  
The Court held that the MWA is not preempted under Machinists either.  The MWA does 
not enter a field occupied by the NLRA and even explicitly allows for NLRA priority. Further, the 
MWA allows employers and employees to collectively bargain around the minimum wage 
requirements, intentionally leaving this area unregulated for the free market to control. 
 
ERISA does not preempt the MWA because the MWA does not affect the types of benefits an 
employer must provide or force employers to provide benefits at all 
 The Court disagreed with Western’s argument that ERISA was designed to cover the entire 
field of employee benefits, and thus, any state regulation is preempted. When evaluating for 
                                                     
7  Moseley v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 654, 658, 188 P.3d 1136, 1140 (2008). 
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ERISA preemption, courts should assume Congress was not trying to replace state law.14 ERISA’s 
preemption clause states that with limited exceptions it should supersede state laws relating to 
employee benefit plans.15 However, the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of ERISA, holding 
that it would be overreaching to preempt every state law that incidentally mentions ERISA plans. 
Wages are traditionally a subject of state concern, and are not included in ERISA’s definition of 
employee welfare benefit plan, so regulation of wages per se is not within the scope of ERISA.16 
 
The MWA does not refer to employee welfare benefit plans for the purposes of ERISA preemption 
 When a state law merely mentions a covered employee welfare benefit plan or includes the 
word ERISA in its text, the law is not necessarily preempted by ERISA.17 In a similar case, a U.S. 
district court recently held that a law that mentioned ERISA benefits, but did not force employers 
to provide a particular set of benefits, alter plans, or provide benefits at all, did not refer to ERISA 
for purposes of preemption.18 The MWA does not affect or alter ERISA plans, so the Court held 
that the MWA does not refer to ERISA for preemption purposes.  
 
The MWA does not impermissibly connect with ERISA plans 
 The MWA does not regulate the type of benefits granted by ERISA plans, does not require 
the establishment of a separate benefit plan to comply with state law, does not impose reporting, 
disclosure, funding, or vesting requirements, and does not regulate ERISA relationships, such as 
the relationship between the plan and the employer or the employer and employee. Thus, the MWA 
passes the Ninth-Circuit’s four-factor test.19 
 
The MWA is not unconstitutionally vague under the United States Constitution or the Nevada 
Constitution because health benefits are defined within the text of the amendment itself and the 
related NAC provisions define health insurance 
 “The void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”20 Civil laws are not held to the same strict vagueness standard that 
criminal laws are.21  However, a law must still provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice 
and must not lack standards to the point that discriminatory enforcement is encouraged.22 
 
The MWA provides persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited 
 The argument that “health benefits” is vague was unpersuasive to the Court because the 
MWA defines “health benefits”: explicitly stating that the employer must make insurance available 
to the employee and dependents with premiums of not more than 10 percent of the employee’s 
taxable income.23 “Health insurance” is defined elsewhere24, and together these provisions 
adequately explain what health benefits qualify the employer to pay the lower minimum wage. 
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The MWA does not authorize or encourage seriously discriminatory enforcement 
 Western offered no evidence that unionized employers were given an unfair advantage by 
the MWA, and failed to demonstrate that the MWA encourages arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement. The state enforcement agency could simply compare Western’s insurance offerings 
to those specified in Nevada’s Administrative Code to make a (non-arbitrary) determination. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Court held that the MWA is not preempted by either the NLRA or ERISA, and is 
similarly not void for vagueness.  Thus, the Court denied Western’s petition for extraordinary 
relief. 
